Taiwan Today

Scholars in the field of politics and international relations have long argued that the rule of law is essential for a nation to democratize and remain a democracy. In The Second Long March, Peter Kien-hong Yu, professor in the School of Business and Enterprise at the Malaysian campus of Australia's Swinburne University, goes a step further: He attributes the Republic of China's (ROC) success in democratizing specifically to its leaders' respect for its Constitution.

Critics might say this is too grand a theory or that there are contending theories that should be considered to explain Taiwan's democratization. Constitutionalism, in their view, is not the only variable and advancing it to the exclusion of others may hinder the development of a better (certainly broader) approach.

Defending his view, Yu writes that Taiwan's leaders used the Constitution in the nation's life-and-death struggle against the Chinese communists and later on as the legal basis for the ROC's democratization and that the two were intimately connected. According to Yu, his is the fundamental theory upon which other theories must rest.

At first glance Yu seems to be overreaching. But is he? It is certainly true that Taiwan became a democracy while under fire. It was, or closely resembled, a country at war. Given mainland China's size and its military power, not to mention its determination to "liberate" Taiwan, the author may not be far off the mark if one were looking for a sine qua non explanation. Clearly ROC leaders adroitly used Taiwan's democratic polity as the excuse for rejecting Beijing's calls for unification and a talking point to gain support from the international community to uphold Taiwan's sovereignty.

Yu does not reject what he sees as "other explanations" (not theories) for Taiwan's democratization. He is cognizant Taiwan is a unique case. Taiwan arguably democratized faster than any nation in world history. It did so without the advantage of a positive (democratizing) colonial experience or the help of the military and democratized without violence. There is much to say about Taiwan's political modernization.

Yu likewise understands that economic development facilitated the democratization process; indeed he acknowledges Western scholars' argument that when a nation's per capita income hits a certain level and has created a middle class, democratization naturally follows. Yu also notes the United States cajoled and pressured Taiwan to end its authoritarian system and its role was sui generis. But these factors Yu does not consider to be theories. Theory is more.

In making his case, Yu carefully refutes several theories. He does not think the balance of power theory provides a good explanation for Taiwan's democratization based on the fact that there was no balance until the outbreak of the Korean War, though he does think it had some validity after that. What Yu says is that it affords the context for democratization, but does not explain it.

Nor does Yu accept deterrence theory, which some scholars employ to explain Taiwan's success in building and sustaining a democratic polity and a democratic culture. He contends Taiwan never possessed deterrence by itself. It was always inferior to mainland China in military strength; the United States made up the difference. Taiwan's leaders, moreover, were also unsure about whether deterrence would work as evidenced by their starting to develop nuclear weapons and then stopping.

Effective Lobbyists

Regarding diplomacy, Yu writes that Taiwan has long had good diplomats and quality lobbyists in the United States. Anyone who has spent time in Washington, DC or has considered Taipei's effectiveness in operating there knows this is true. Along with Israel and Japan, it is considered one of the three most talented. But was that a necessary condition to Taiwan's democratizing? If so, Yu asks, why? Then one must consider that Beijing has its supporters and its diplomats have learned (especially in recent years) how to deal, some would say deftly, with the United States.

The author addresses Taiwan's role in promoting democracy in mainland China as reinforcing its own democratization, especially in its later stages. He notes mainland China's leaders have shown some appreciation for Taiwan's democracy. But most have not. Anyway officials in Beijing who see democracy as the wave of the future do not think it will be American-style democracy, which is the way Taiwan has gone. Rather mainland China will likely espouse Asian democracy, which most other Asian countries favor and which comports with the idea that democracy may stand in the way of economic growth and if pursued too abruptly will precipitate social and political instability.

The professor speaks of eight alternative theories in all. The others are less controversial or are not widely accepted as serious explanations for Taiwan's democratization. Only a few readers will think they are important.

Yu thence sticks to his view that upholding the Constitution is the best theory and the only one that is consistent and cannot be refuted. But does not that position require more substantiation? Indeed, Yu insists that upholding the Constitution was the common thread among the national leaders' views of Taiwan's best way to deal with the People's Republic of China while keeping democratization on track. Former presidents such as Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Shui-bian, Yu argues, appeared to share little in terms of their visions for Taiwan's future, yet they concurred that the Constitution (even though Chiang excluded some of its important provisions and Chen at times said he wanted to scrap it) provides the instructions, or is the bible, for dealing with both tasks.

This is where the concept of a "long march," which Yu compares to Mao Zedong's epic Long March, figures in. Yu contends that each and every one of Taiwan's presidents had to struggle against the People's Republic of China and for democracy and that the two goals were linked. It is in this vein that he examines Taiwan's five past presidents and their administrations and sets out the evidence for his thesis.

Yu describes Chiang Kai-shek's determination to fulfill the Constitution and keep the national identity as a straight line on the "Second Long March." During his tenure many thought that Chiang had "circumvented" the Constitution, or worse, through the Temporary Provisions that canceled (actually held in abeyance) some important provisions of it, such as the two-term limit for presidents and a number of civil and political rights. Some also think Chiang made a horrible blunder in stubbornly sticking to the "one-China principle" when the United States was moving toward a two-China policy and the People's Republic of China was winning the global battle for legitimacy. However, Chiang professed democracy and pursued it, though slowly, and may have been prescient in knowing ethnic politics would be bad for Taiwan and, with that being so, he could not consider two Chinas.

It was, of course, on Chiang's watch that Beijing was admitted to the United Nations and Taipei expelled, after which a spate of countries moved their embassies to Beijing. Yu believes that, in spite of this, Chiang kept both the Constitution and the one-China idea alive, and that this was the correct path. His evidence? Many countries only acknowledged or took note of (rather than recognized) the People's Republic of China's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. And Mao finally admitted that he made a mistake in changing the nation's title.

Engineering a Miracle

Yu contends Chiang should also be credited with launching Taiwan's democracy by engineering its economic miracle, which produced the per capita income needed to create a middle class and democratic politics. Chiang also held elections locally and if one believes, as the opposition has since contended, that Taiwan's democratization was a process of "from the bottom up" (or started with local politics), then he was the early creator of Taiwan's democracy.

After Chiang died in April 1975, his vice president, Yen Chia-kan became president--according to the Constitution. He served as president until 1978. Yu calls his march a "short line."

Yu, to some students of Taiwan politics including this writer, sees the Yen reign as more important than it actually was. He believes Yen could have instituted new and different policies; he did not have to, in other words, stick to the Constitution as his predecessor did.

An alternative interpretation is that Taiwan's political system was, and still is to a lesser degree, a mixed system containing elements of a Cabinet, a parliament and a presidency. Moreover, at that time ultimate political power rested in the hands of the person that ran the Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang, and, some would say, the military and police. Thus Chiang Kai-shek's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, wielded political power, not Yen. In fact, for three years the younger Chiang governed from the premiership. This did not create a political standoff because Yen realized that he was only a caretaker president and did not wish to challenge the younger Chiang, and instead cooperated with him at every turn. The hybrid nature of the political system made this possible and one might thank the Constitution for this--though in many ways Taiwan's mixed system had serious flaws (as becomes evident later).

On the Defensive

In any event, Chiang Ching-kuo became president after an uncontested election in 1978. He began a march that Yu calls a "meandering line." This was necessitated, says the author, by a change in circumstances. He means by this that the hope to "liberate" the mainland was now dead and Taiwan was on the defensive in terms of its claims to legitimacy due to Beijing winning the diplomatic recognition contest. This was made worse by Deng Xiaoping engineering an economic boom that made the People's Republic of China an economic and political force to reckon with.

Chiang Ching-kuo's clear and simple answer to the predicament was democracy. He therefore launched Taiwan's "rapid drive" toward democratization. Part of this process involved "Taiwanization," since Taiwanese were the majority of the population. Hence the younger Chiang brought many Taiwanese into the Nationalist Party and the government. Meanwhile, CCK, as he was known to most, persuaded the United States that Taiwan had adopted a democratic system, or was well on the way, though he did not succeed in keeping diplomatic ties with Washington.

Chiang Ching-kuo had the opportunity to choose who would be his successor and decided to pass the baton of political power to Lee Teng-hui. Lee's march, according to Yu, was a "zigzag line." Lee had to (and wanted to) proceed with democratization, which at this stage the opposition (now much stronger) said meant further Taiwanization, allowing a competing political party, and handling calls for self-determination or independence. This translated into dumping the idea of unification; but how could Lee do this, preserve the Nationalist Party and prevent war with the People's Republic of China? Indeed this was difficult: Lee had to walk a tightrope on these matters and show both cunning and leadership, which he did. Yu describes Lee as a believer in both ideology and pragmatism and at once saving and betraying the Nationalist Party.

Yet Lee's record seems a contradictory one regarding the Constitution. In the 1990s, he oversaw changes in the Constitution that were obviously needed. Some would say he preserved it that way. He formally ended the struggle with the People's Republic of China and at the same time broke political links with the mainland in a way that one might see as in violation of the spirit of the Constitution. He increased economic and people-to-people ties across the Taiwan Strait, yet he also created tensions with Beijing. One might say Yu views the Lee Teng-hui presidency as dealing with contradictions and Lee as ruthless and at times undemocratic, but effective.

The author describes Chen Shui-bian's presidency (or march, to use Yu's terminology), as a "forced, untrodden, split line with side roads." Indeed Chen's job was not an easy one. He was an "accidental president" in that he was first elected in 2000 because the Nationalist Party split. The fact that Chen's party had but one-third of the seats in the legislature made it difficult for him to govern.

Chen initially sought to rule by building a coalition, but he showed little leadership in doing this and (perhaps because of where his heart and support base were) chose instead to rule through ethnic politics. About 70 percent of the people in Taiwan speak Holo. Chen thought he could build a majority from this base. This alienated many mainland Chinese (the most recent immigrants), as well as people of Hakka descent and aborigines. Chen also talked sometimes of a "rainbow coalition," but he never made this work. A sizeable portion of the population stayed loyal to the Nationalist Party while factionalism plagued Chen's administration.

Meanwhile, Chen's playing the "ethnic card" hurt his image in the United States and in overseas Chinese communities, as well as in Beijing. Further, Taiwan experienced an economic recession that damaged his presidency and the nation. Worse, allegations of corruption very seriously undermined his leadership and that of his party. Some opinion surveys before Chen left office indicated he had the support of less than 10 percent of the population.

How did Chen do in terms of the Republic of China's Constitution? Yu asserts that Chen tried to make it a local constitution, but failed. The professor charges that Chen also sought to rule by ignoring the Constitution and caused press freedom and some civil and political rights to decline. It was even said that leaders in Beijing secretly liked Chen since he destroyed the appeal of the Taiwan model of democracy in the People's Republic of China.

Presidents' Scorecard

Yu's grand or encompassing theory will, of course, have its detractors. All such theories do. One difficulty is that the qualities of the presidents do not really comport with their preserving the Constitution. Chiang Ching-kuo by many accounts (certainly recent opinion polls that indicate he was the best of Taiwan's five past presidents) democratized the country by fiat. He did not fix the Constitution's defects though he certainly respected it and kept it intact.

Chen Shui-bian, who is considered the worst according to opinion polls, did not damage the Constitution. In fact he tried, some say, to strengthen it. It was Lee Teng-hui that amended it. He made it work better, yet he did not attend to certain serious flaws in that document that needed to be fixed. It still needs amending.

Another difficulty with a big theory such as Yu's is the fact that much of what happened in Taiwan during the post-World War II period was influenced, if not determined, by the United States. Taiwan would not exist were it not for the United States and most ROC citizens, and certainly political leaders, realize this sometimes-inconvenient _truth. Fortun-ately for Taiwan the United States perceived, after the onset of the Korean War, that it had an interest in a separate, sovereign and democratic Taiwan.

Yet Yu deserves credit for formulating a basic theory. Few dare do this. His theory is heuristic. It makes one think. It is a useful framework for explaining Taiwan's success in democratizing, which still interests leaders of developing nations and scholars everywhere.

Yu also provides an interesting look at Taiwan's politics as he goes. He is a homegrown observer and knows the ins and outs of how the system works in principle and in practice. He adds tidbits of inside information along the way, many of which have not been cited or at least assessed by other scholars. This makes the book a more interesting read.

The Second Long March is recommended to all who want to view Taiwan's history and politics, especially its democratization, from a unique perspective. Why is this so important? Taiwan is the only non-negotiable issue between the United States and the People's Republic of China, the sole superpower and the world's foremost rising power, and the relationship between them is the basis of stability in the global economy and international politics.
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John F. Copper is the Stanley J. Buckman Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee. He is the author of more than 25 books on mainland China and Taiwan. His most recent books are Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan (2006), Historical Dictionary of Taiwan (Republic of China) Third Edition (2007), and Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? Fifth Edition (2009).

Copyright © 2009 by John F. Copper